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Can There Be a Good Death? 
 
1. Managing the good death 
Dying, like most other human acts, can be done well or badly.  But unlike many other things we 
do, we only die once; so it is important to get it right first time.  According to the Stoic 
philosopher Seneca [1: p.6], ‘learning how to live takes a whole life, and, which may surprise 
you more, it takes a whole life to learn how to die’.  Seneca was voicing the conviction, common 
amongst ancient philosophers, that, while death is inevitable, how we die is highly dependent on 
the virtues, skills, planning and attention we bring to it, and that the best deaths are well-prepared 
ones.  A superficially similar view has been taken in our own times by medical and other 
professionals concerned with the care of the dying.  Doctors and nurses treating terminal 
illnesses, palliative care staff and those involved in the hospice movement have increasingly 
recognised that dying is an existential predicament as well as a physiological condition, and that 
dying people need consolation for the mind along with physical relief for the body.  Sometimes, 
however, these twin objectives can be hard to combine.  Although technology can prolong life 
and reduce the distress of the physical frame, it often does so at the high cost of the subject’s 
independence and autonomy, those vital bulwarks of her humanity.   
     According to the Debate of the Age Health and Care Study Group, ‘good deaths’ are those in 
which the subject is not only kept free of pain but retains a high measure of control, autonomy 
and independence over her fate (reported by Smith [2: pp.129-30]).  He or she retains the 
ultimate say over what treatments should be administered, and when those treatments should 
stop.  Instead of being seen merely as a failing piece of physiological machinery, the dying 
subject is accorded full personal rights, including a continuing right to self-determination.  More 
important than keeping a patient alive at all costs is facilitating the kind of death which forms a 
fitting parting from life.  A dying person should be enabled, wherever possible, to make her final 
dispositions as she wishes, and attain a state of bodily and mental peace.  In place of ‘a soulless 
death in intensive care’ [2: p.129], in which the doctor is the master of ceremonies, the 
‘postmodern death’ (as Tony Walter calls it) is one in which ‘[t]he feelings and preferences of 
the dying person … take precedence over standardised nursing regimes’ Walter [3: p.194].  This 
is the kind of death that the hospice movement aims to provide, in which the dying subject 
retains as far as possible the authorship of the final chapter of her life, rather than ceding it to 
others   
   Needless to say, not everyone is able to have such a death.   A person who dies suddenly in an 
accident, or succumbs slowly to Alzheimer’s, or contracts a virulent form of cancer requiring 
heavy sedation to check the pain may have little opportunity for leave-taking, existential 
reflection, or more practical issues concerning the transmission of her goods.  Even under more 
‘ideal’ conditions, fear, confusion, delusions of hope and the sheer unfamiliarity of the situation 
can also make it hard for the dying subject to summon the cool collectedness to appraise and take 
charge of her predicament. Small wonder, then, that generations of philosophers and religious 
teachers have advised long-term planning for death, so that it should not take us too much by 
surprise. The idea that a kalos thanatos (exemplary dying) is typically one that has been well 
prepared-for has lately been reiterated by Allan Kellehear, who construes such a death as one 
that ‘conforms to the wider community expectation of making death as positive and meaningful 
to as many people as possible’ [4: p.90].  Postmodern death must not be a selfish death; while 
one seeks appropriate closure of one’s own life, one also has to take appropriate thought for 
others.  
    Although contemporary care of the dying is informed by a far more humane understanding of 
the existential situation of the dying than was once the case, there is a serious risk that the 
undoubted advances that have been made can lead to a sanitised view of death, and an over-
complacent estimate of our ability to blunt its sting.  In part, this worry concerns the very feature 
of current care for the dying which might be accounted its chief excellence: the transmutation of 
dying into a managed process, with its constituent rules and routines, its principles of good 
practice, and (as inevitable as death itself) its professionalization. As long ago as 1998, Bethne 
Hart et al commented that hospice care is ‘becoming increasingly institutionalized and 
bureaucratized, with the risk of a significant compromise in the movement’s guiding ideology’ 
[5: pp.69-70].   The twelve principles of a good death enunciated by the Debate of the Age 
Health and Care Study Group present a blueprint for the care of the dying which stresses, among 
other things, giving the subject control over what happens, where it happens and who is present 
at the end; ensuring not just pain relief but ‘dignity and privacy’; and providing access to 
information and spiritual support (for the full list of principles, see [2: p.129]).  Yet for all its 
good intentions, this rather gives the impression that looking after the dying is akin to organising 
a conference, assembling flat-pack furniture or baking a cake: something that ought to turn out 
all right so long as the rules are followed.   
   It would be naïve to think that existential peace at dying could be a product of good practice.  
Perhaps very few people do in fact think this; those who work with the dying, both in hospices 
and in more traditional medical environments, are sufficiently experienced to realise that, at 
most, following principles can assist in easing people out of life, not ensure that their passing 
will constitute a perfect ending.  Yet even this more limited programme may be a hangover from 
the days when the medical model of terminal care prevailed, and the emotional and spiritual 
requirements of the dying subject received scant attention from health-care professionals.  Once 
the latter needs were recognised, efforts began to be made to satisfy them; but the welcome 
advent of a more holistic approach to maximising the dying patient’s welfare continues to 
display its growth from a medical root.  Since the practice of medicine has the primary aim of 
healing the body, care of the dying has naturally gone on to embrace the healing of the soul.  The 
aim is that the dying person should leave this world in a state of maximum physical and mental 
comfort, with her needs of all kinds accommodated.  
     Still, the intention to allow dying persons themselves more control over how their life-story is 
completed is hard to fault, at least as an ideal.  In a recent essay, David Schenck and Lori Roscoe 
reasonably observe that ‘[w]hile a “good death” is unlikely to be realized without access to pain 
management and good medical care, the tools that allow us to find meaning and purpose in old 
age and death are unlikely to be medical or scientific’ [6: p.62].  They suggest that dying people 
would be well advised to consider their current state as the final chapter in the ‘narrative’ of their 
life, rather than as an isolated, tragic or traumatic episode.  To know how to die means knowing 
how to complete one’s life-narrative in a fitting way, with suitable closure of the main plot-lines.  
On Schenck and Roscoe’s view, ‘[c]reating a “last chapter” to one’s life narrative may allow us 
to die with our human dignity intact, regardless of the circumstances’.  This way death is ‘an 
action and decision rather than something that happens to us’ [6: p.73], and if we cannot fully 
control the circumstances of our death we can at least substantially influence its meaning. 
    Unfortunately, the expectation that lives can be brought to a suitable and dignified end 
‘regardless of the circumstances’ is frequently disappointed in practice.  Some life-narratives are 
so badly constructed that no ending, however creative, will provide them with the coherence they 
have previously lacked; others go awry because of external factors beyond the subject’s control.  
Many dying people no longer possess the mental or physical capacities to exercise authorial 
control over their final days or hours.  The assurance that all will be well with us provided only 
that we apply sufficient creative effort to the task of dying is often highly unrealistic.  To 
suppose that the fat can always be pulled from the fire is another manifestation of the undue 
confidence commonly placed in our ability to manage the process of dying.  Seneca’s claim that 
it takes a whole life to learn how to die is a reminder that we need to get the plot-line right 
throughout our life if we are to be able to end it well. 
    There is also a deeper problem with the assumption of many health professionals that, with the 
right management, people can be encouraged or assisted to have a good death.  This is that there 
is no such thing as a good death, and that those who have the care of the dying are therefore 
aiming at the impossible.  To the defence of this bold claim I now turn. 
 
2.  Why there are no good deaths 
To say that there is no such thing as a good death is not to deny that some dyings are better than 
others.  Nor is it to denigrate the fine work done by doctors, nurses, palliative care workers and 
hospice staff in helping patients to die as well as possible.  Rather, the claim is the philosophical 
one that since the ending of a human life is always the loss of a valuable, irreplaceable thing, the 
expression ‘good death’ is necessarily an oxymoron. 
    One possible misunderstanding of this claim is worth averting straightaway.  To say that death 
involves the loss of something valuable and irreplaceable does not imply that it is always wrong 
to bring death about, or to permit it to occur sooner than it otherwise would have done.  It may 
sometimes be better for a person’s life to end than to continue in pain and hopelessness, and in 
these cases there may be grounds to consider euthanasia.  But to claim that death is better for 
some person than life in his present condition is not to hold that death is better for him tout court; 
better still would have been his restoration to health and fitness.  To lose his life may be 
preferable, as things stand, than to continuing it, but it would be much better still to live a longer, 
pain-free life.  
    The strategy for showing that there can be no good deaths consists in identifying internal 
tensions in the notion of a ‘good death’.   My contention is that the plausible desiderata of the 
good death form an inconsistent set.  The nub of the argument can be stated simply: since death 
is of the greatest existential consequence to us, a ‘good’ death must be a self-aware death in 
which the subject realises the import of what is happening to her; however, since such realisation 
involves recognising the awful finality of death, it is incompatible with her achieving the tranquil 
acceptance of her state, the disposition to say ‘Let it happen’, that is another desideratum of the 
‘good’ death.  It looks as though we die tranquilly only by pulling the wool over our own eyes.   
    Maybe, as we cannot avoid dying, we would be wise to secure a peaceful death by doing just 
this!  But such a dying would be an inauthentic one, involving an act of deliberate self-deception 
which undermines our dignity, where preserving that dignity is a further plausible necessary 
condition of dying a ‘good’ death.   David Velleman remarks that he may have been oblivious at 
his birth, ‘but I don’t want to be caught napping at my death’; death is just too momentous a life-
event to sleep through [7: p.1].  To miss one’s own death would be like paying close attention to 
the earlier acts of a play and then dozing off for the dénouement. 
     If dying without distressful sensations of any kind were sufficient for a good death, then such 
deaths could readily be procured by administering sedatives or mood-lifting drugs to dying 
people.  Yet neither stupor nor hilarious jollity are optimal states in which to pass our final days 
or moments.  To enjoy one’s own dying would no more be dying well than existing as a brain in 
a vat being fed constant pleasurable sensations down the wires would be living well. 1   To be 
sure, dying tranquilly is a very different thing from dying in a state of stupor or inattention; 
tranquillity is an attitude of mind, not an absence of mind.  Being tranquil in the face of death has 
traditionally been thought virtuous, even noble.  Yet mustering a tranquil spirit in the face of 
death is not only psychologically difficult but questionably rational.  Tranquillity involves more 
than not weeping and wailing at the approach of death; it crucially comprises a willingness to 
accept what is happening to us, and it is this which makes its appropriateness at the death-bed 
dubious.  Contemporary writers who encourage a ‘spiritual’ attitude in the dying need to be 
cautious about begging existential questions and painting death and dying in warmer colours 
than they merit.  Douglas Davies describes a ‘spirituality of death as a means of focusing and 
giving voice to experience, emotion and self-reflection in the face of death and to do it with a 
positive valuation’ [8: p.85].  But what if being positive in the face of death is unwarranted?   
Maybe, like Dylan Thomas, we should ‘Rage, rage against the dying of the light’ – an attitude 
that certainly excludes any thought that death can be ‘good’. 2   Only where death alone can save 
one from intolerable physical or mental anguish can it be an object of rational preference; but 
then it is willed as a means, not an end. 
     The claim that the existential significance of death should, ideally, be recognised by the dying 
subject has been challenged by Lars Sandman, who argues that if something harmful is going to 
befall us anyway, then we are actually better off if we do not know about it [9: pp.80-2].  Where 
prior knowledge of a potential evil enables us to avert it or mitigate its worst effects, then it is 
plainly good to have it.  But where an evil is beyond prevention or alleviation, we gain nothing 
but pointless pain by being aware of it.  Sandman criticises writers who claim that ‘reality 
contact’ is an objective human good and that painful knowledge of the truth is always superior to 
blissful ignorance.  Treating with scepticism currently fashionable claims that the ‘unexamined 
life’ is a defective life – even a life not worth living, – Sandman notes that we quite often prefer 
to remain in ignorance of things we can’t mend.  For example, if we desire not to be slandered, 
then it would be bad for us to be slandered even if we never get to hear about it; and so we might 
quite rationally prefer not to hear about it, since that would only make us unhappy to no purpose.   
Similarly, if death is bad, then it is bad whether or not we are aware of its badness, and to make 
things worse by confronting death in a state of existential anguish seems merely perverse.  Far 
better to slip away thinking distracting thoughts, or no thoughts at all. 
    The trouble with Sandman’s argument is that it fails to acknowledge that different events in 
life have very different degrees of existential significance.  Being slandered is a genuine evil, and 
in some instances a very serious one with far-reaching effects; but it is not one of the universal 
pivotal events or experiences in human life, and a person who is slandered without finding about 
it is not thereby deprived of essential knowledge of what it means to be human.  ‘Reality contact’ 
seems more important in regard to the central aspects of human existence – growing up, forming 
relationships, finding one’s place in the social world, pursuing life-defining goals and ambitions, 
enduring bereavement of loved ones, facing up to sickness or old age, dying – to miss or 
misunderstand which would render a life incomplete or inauthentic.  (To be sure, we cannot 
reflectively experience our birth in the way we can our death, but the fact that we cannot make 
anything of the first of the crucial poles of our existence only strengthens the case for making the 
most of the other.)  To avoid thinking about the meaning of something as important as our own 
death, or to seek to meet it in a state of drug-induced un- or semi-consciousness, is not rational 
avoidance of something we cannot mend and do not need to know about, but an unworthy 
attempt to avoid knowing what we ought to know, unpalatable thought that knowledge may be. 
    And that knowledge is distinctly unpalatable.  Even people who believe in a life after death are 
liable to be appalled at what the dying Gerontius, in Cardinal Newman’s famous poem, describes 
as:  
 This emptying out of each constituent 
 And natural force, by which I come to be [10]. 
In one of the best essays ever written about death, the Duke de la Rochefoucauld noted the 
difference between facing death courageously and affecting to despise it in the manner of the 
ancient sages, who pretended that death was an unimportant occurrence or even a blessing.  To 
imagine that death is no evil, La Rochefoucauld thought, requires refusing to look at it squarely: 
‘for every one that views it in its proper light will find it sufficiently terrible’.  We have to ‘avoid 
considering death in all its circumstances, if we would not think it the greatest of evils’ [11: 
p.29].  Traditional ‘philosophical fortitude’ consisted in doing with a good grace what could not 
be avoided; but La Rochefoucauld questioned whether those who claimed to be indifferent to 
death were being honest with themselves. Modern proponents of the idea of the ‘good death’ do 
not, of course, normally claim that death – in the sense of being dead – is a good, or even an 
indifferent, thing.  But if they avoid La Rochefoucauld’s strictures on that front, they are 
vulnerable to a charge of inconsistency in supposing that this terminal disaster can be faced with 
a rational tranquillity.  In any case, what looks like tranquillity in some dying people may be no 
more than what La Rochefoucauld described as ‘a want of sensibility, which prevents their being 
aware of the greatness of the evil’ [11: p.32].  
     La Rochefoucauld saw that the dying person who properly recognises the prospect of her own 
imminent non-existence naturally feels the most intense existential anxiety.  For what could be 
worse than succumbing to a condition of complete oblivion?  No amount of control over the 
conditions in which one dies can compensate for the fact that one is advancing towards a 
condition in which one will have no control whatsoever.  The paramount virtue at this time is the 
courage which sustains the self in the face of its own dissolution.  But true courage before death 
is a clear-minded courage which eschews any pretence that death is other than an awful thing, 
the loss not just of future opportunities but the extinction of one’s very self.  This is consequently 
not, in existential terms, a peaceful death, since there can be no peace at the moment of 
maximum existential anxiety.  (There can be, in some cases, a stillness or steadiness produced by 
courage, but that is quite another thing.)  For a peaceful death, one has to be ready to deceive 
oneself, or think distracting thoughts.  If one succeeds in this, one may be able to do without 
courage, thereby dying a ‘happier’ death but a less virtuous and authentic one. 
     This account may seem vulnerable to the following dilemma. A life may go well or badly in 
respect to its constituent goods, goals, achievements and narrative coherence.  If it goes badly, 
then its final extinction is no great loss, since it was heading nowhere much worth going anyway.  
But for it to go well implies a certain structure of completed goals and attained successes; and a 
life which has this feature does not need to go on any longer, having already proved its worth.  
Therefore there is nothing really to regret (first-personally or third-personally) about the 
termination of either good or not-so-good lives, and existential angst at the end is out of place. 
    This dilemma is spurious. If a life has gone badly, then its ending unredeemed merely 
accentuates its unsatisfactory nature.  But if a life has gone well, its finishing is still tragic 
because, had it been longer, it might have acquired more worth still.  To this it might be 
countered that where the narrative lines of a life have been brought to a fitting conclusion, in the 
creative manner envisaged by Schenk and Roscoe, more of the same is needless; the book of life 
is already long enough.  Yet while narrative closure is undoubtedly preferable to narrative 
truncation, to suppose it to be enough to make a life (and, by implication, the death which ends 
it) a good one is unwarranted.  I have argued elsewhere that while it would probably not be a 
good thing for human lives to go on for ever (mainly because, as Bernard Williams [13] has 
argued, infinite lives could preserve no structure consonant with retention of a sense of self-
identity), actual lives are much too short for us to fulfil our full potential (see too Scarre [14: 
ch.3]).  There is always much more that we could have done, if only we had had more time.  
Life-stories proceed and end in many different ways; but the fact that they all end means, as 
Velleman puts it, that ‘[n]one of these is a good story’ [7: p.2].   
   In any case, there are significant disanalogies between lives and narratives.  For one thing, no 
one is ever the sole author of her own life-story, which is only one strand in a highly complex, 
multi-authored social narrative, in which many life-stories are enmeshed.  Notoriously, too, we 
are frequently surprised by the way the plot-line develops; unlike the writers of books, we cannot 
make everything go just according to plan.  Most relevantly to the present discussion, no life ever 
ends with the words ‘and they lived happily ever after’.  When a life finishes, there is no prospect 
of a sequel; the leading character disappears for ever on the last page.  The narrative of a life is 
neither replaced nor replaceable by another narrative.  The mild sadness that an author or a 
reader may feel at reaching the end of a story is readily assuaged by turning to write, or read, 
another story.  But the author of a life (the owner of the narrative) has no existence outside it.  
Spectators of that life can appraise it and move on but the subject of the life is uniquely 
coterminous with her own story.  (Novelists would be very reluctant to complete their works if 
they knew they would themselves vanish as soon as they had typed the final full stop.)  When the 
life finishes, the narrative self-destructs, leaving nothing behind beyond its memory in other 
minds.  Death does not merely complete the story but eliminates it.  This is essentially 
Wittgenstein’s point in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ([14: section 6.431]): ‘at death the 
world does not alter, but comes to an end’.  It is no exaggeration to call this prospect, as La 
Rochefoucauld does, ‘sufficiently terrible’. 
     Some deaths are plainly worse than other deaths.  To die in a state of extreme pain, despair, 
remorse, isolation, shattered hopes or disillusion is an unsatisfactory way to close one’s final 
chapter.  But if the arguments of this paper are right, then the very idea of a good death, however 
framed, is open to serious objection.  To recap, even the best deaths fail to make the grade as 
good deaths because two highly plausible conditions for a ‘good’ death – that we should be 
aware of the existential significance of what is happening to us and simultaneously retain a 
degree of tranquillity (an absence of mental anguish) – are rationally and psychologically 
mutually exclusive: rationally, because, as La Rochefoucauld observes, a proper awareness of 
what is happening to us shows it to be sufficiently terrible to render an attitude of calm 
acceptance inapt; psychologically, because such awareness is naturally associated with emotions 
of distress and sorrow, not quiet and calm. 
 
3.  Dying and the virtues     
To close this paper, I should like to say something briefly about one significant lacuna in 
contemporary conceptions of the ‘good death’.  To remove this lacuna is not, unfortunately, to 
vindicate the idea that good deaths are, after all, possible; but it is to show something important 
about how we can die well – or as well as possible, given that nothing can remove the sting of 
death, ‘nature’s pang in the final separation’.  The complaint is that the prevailing views of the 
good death are almost entirely silent on the virtues required by the dying subject.  The probable 
reason is, once again, their origin in a primarily medical model of palliative care and treatment of 
the terminally sick.  Ignoring the moral qualities that might be fitting for a dying person, the 
focus is instead on the facilities that should be provided in order to make her dying easier.  The 
impression given is that dying well is mostly about having the right opportunities and services 
available to draw on – a strikingly consumerist conception and one which imposes no moral 
demands on the subject.  There is insufficient recognition, even amongst those who speak of a 
‘spirituality of death’, that the quality of dying depends on the qualities of character that the 
dying person brings to her last and most testing experience on earth.  This failure to mention the 
virtues needed to die in a manner appropriate for a human being would have greatly surprised 
proponents of the Stoic or medieval ars moriendi traditions.  A plausible short-list of such virtues 
might include patience, fortitude, a readiness to put up with pain, a capacity to evaluate one’s 
past life without evasion or distortion, a readiness to forgive and ask forgiveness, and a 
disposition to comfort others who will be grieved by one’s passing; to these secular virtues could 
be added certain theological ones, such as faith, hope, repentance for sin and submission to 
God’s will. 
    It might be said in their defence that the conceptions of the good death that have chiefly 
engaged the attention of health professionals and including hospice staff are those which are 
most relevant to their own practice, as the facilitators of ‘good’ dying.  Yet the impression 
conveyed that a good death can be procured by certain patterns of practice which make no 
demands on the character-strengths of the dying subject remains misleading.  Encouraging dying 
persons to consider their social responsibilities and to conform to the social norms is no 
substitute for helping them to develop the qualities needed to die.  On the older view, the 
subject’s own preparation for death, fortified by the appropriate virtues, was the most crucial 
factor, and even the most optimal external conditions could not compensate for its absence.  
   Might suitably virtuous self-preparation be not merely necessary for dying well but also 
sufficient for a good death?  Perhaps a good death should simply be identified with a virtuous 
death.   However, this suggestion goes too far in ‘moralising’ the concept of a good death.   Few 
people have died more virtuously than Father Maximilian Kolbe, who voluntarily stood in for a 
fellow-prisoner who had been condemned to death at Auschwitz.  Kolbe’s death by slow 
starvation in a prison cell could scarcely be bettered – in a moral sense.  Yet a death like his is 
not a rational object of desire, even if we aspire to die virtuously (and not, say, in an impatient 
and cowardly manner that uselessly upsets others).  To call Kolbe’s death a ‘good’ one is to 
stretch language much too far.  
    Even so, the importance of the virtues to the dying subject is paramount.  It would therefore be 
good to see more emphasis placed on assisting the dying to produce, or sustain, the qualities of 
character which will make them ‘perform’ well the business of dying.  Admittedly, there may be 
little that can be done to induce the appropriate virtues in dying persons who have failed to 
acquire them in a lifetime.  But it is undoubtedly in people’s interests to muster what patience or 
fortitude they can when dying.  The extent to which they can be helped to do this by friends, 
priests, counsellors or carers will vary and may never be extensive, but any opportunities should 
be seized.  In the last analysis, dying is a do-it-yourself activity, supported by the virtues.  This is 
what Seneca meant in the statement quoted at the start of this essay, and which bears repeating at 
the end: ‘learning how to live takes a whole life, and, which might surprise you more, it takes a 
whole life to learn how to die’. 
              
Notes. 
1. The brain in a vat has frequently featured in the philosophical literature on well-being 
since its introduction in Nozick [15], 42-5.  Nozick envisages a disembodied brain 
artificially preserved in a scientist’s laboratory and provided with a virtual-reality ‘life’ 
that the brain is fooled into thinking is a real one.  Most philosophers have agreed that 
there is something radically unsatisfactory about this illusory ‘life’, no matter how 
pleasant it may appear to its subject.    
2. Hart et al, commenting on the tradition of thinking about the good death stemming from 
E. Kübler-Ross, note that ‘The goal of death with acceptance has in the main been 
received uncritically.’  This has meant that ‘angry, non-accepting and non-compliant 
patients’ have tended to be looked on as ‘deviants who are violating the established 
norm’ ([5], 69).  But perhaps the ‘deviants’ are the people who have most reason on their 
side.  
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